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Abstract: In this paper, I aim to discuss E. J. Lowe's view of the synergy between 
metaphysics and natural science. In doing so, I will extend Lowe’s synergistic 
model to develop a realist account of theological claims thereby responding to 
Byrne’s strong form of eliminativism and agnosticism about theological claims. 
The paper is divided up as follows. In section 1, I will discuss Lowe’s view of 
metaphysics. In section 2, I will explain how Lowe thinks metaphysics and 
natural science are related. In section 3, I will respond to objections against 
Lowe’s conception of metaphysics. In section 4, I will discuss the implications 
of Lowe’s conception of metaphysics for a realist account of theological claims. 
In section 5, I will conclude this paper by claiming that there are excellent 
reasons to extend the synergy between metaphysics and natural science to that 
of theology as well. 





Philosophical controversies concerning the relationship between traditional 
metaphysics and natural science revolve around two main questions. First, there is the 
question of what metaphysical inquiry and its method(s) amount to. Second, there is 
the question of what scientific inquiry and its method(s) amount to. Let us call these 
questions the subject matter M and the subject matter S respectively. The subject matter 
M focuses on investigating the fundamental structure of ultimate reality via an a priori 
(non–empirical) means—rooted in reason. On the other hand, the subject matter S 
focuses on investigating the nature of reality via an a posteriori (empirical) means—
which strictly requires experimental verification. In light of such considerations, it has 
been said that a clear–cut bifurcation can be drawn between the subject matter M and 
the subject matter S. However, establishing any such demarcation line between the 
subject matter M and the subject matter S proves to be easier said than done. As we shall 
see, the difficulty deepens even further if one elevates the epistemic credentials of the 
subject matter M over that of the subject matter S and vice versa. In any case, 




philosophers do not speak in one voice on this matter. Here we can think of two major 
representative positions. To see this, let us consider first the following six claims:   
 
1. The subject matter M and the subject matter S are independent in their own 
right. 
2. The subject matter M and the subject matter S are individually incomplete.  
3. The subject matter M and the subject matter S are interdependent. 
4. The subject matter M is purely speculative.  
5. The subject matter M must operate under the authority of the subject matter S.  
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Collectively let’s call (1)–(3) the Integrationist Thesis and (4)–(6) the Strict Empiricist 
Thesis respectively. The Integrationist Thesis has three layers, namely: (i) independence, 
(ii) incompleteness, and (iii) interdependence. Given layer (i), the subject matter M and 
the subject matter S are said to be independent, that is, each is an autonomously self–
guiding mode of inquiry into the nature of reality. But the question remains: how are 
we supposed to understand the independence invoked in (i)? Traditionally, a highly 
impactful answer comes from Aristotle. In Metaphysics (Γ.1 1003a21), Aristotle 
describes how ‘first philosophy’ (i.e., metaphysics) is independent of other 
disciplines.1 Aristotle claims that, unlike metaphysics, the special disciplines (e.g., 
biology, chemistry, neuroscience, psychology) have a narrow area of focus on 
investigating the nature of reality. For example, biology studies living things. 
Chemistry studies, among other things, chemical elements, their composition, and 
properties. Neuroscience studies the brain’s organization and its function. But 
philosophers of science debate whether physics is fundamental to all other special 
disciplines or sciences (see Laydman and Ross, 2007: 38ff; cf. Rosenberg 2012: Ch. 6). 
But even if physics turns out to be fundamental or basic, still it has a narrow area of 
focus, say matter and energy.  
But for Aristotle, metaphysics is a universal science that studies being qua being.2 As 
Cohen and Reeve remark, Aristotle’s description of the study of ‘being qua being’ does 
not imply as if there is a single subject matter—being qua being—which is under 
investigation. Instead, the phrase ‘being qua being’ involves three things: (A) a study, 
(B) a subject matter (being), and (C) a manner in which the subject matter is studied 
(qua being).3 As Cohen and Reeve further point out, Aristotle’s study does not focus 
on some obscure subject matter identified as ‘being qua being’. Rather it is a study of 
being taken quite in general. That is, metaphysics studies beings, in so far as they are 
beings (Ibid). If we follow Aristotle’s lead here, then the subject matter M can neither be 
 
1 For more details, see Aristotle Metaphysics., trans., by C. D. C. Reeve (2016).  
2 Here the term ‘qua’ comes from Latin and it means ‘in so far as’ or ‘under the aspect’. In this context, 
‘being’ pertains to the subject matter of ontology which studies kinds of beings such as concrete entities 
and abstract as well as universals and particulars. Ontology also studies modes of being which has to do 
with the existence of entities (Honderich, 1995, 82).  
3 Cohen and Reeve (2020, section 1).   




identified with nor can it be reduced to the subject matter S. Similarly, the subject matter 
S can neither be identified with nor can it be reduced to the subject matter M. What this 
means is that metaphysics and natural science cannot hijack each other’s 
independence. If this is true, then in their own particular ways, metaphysics and 
natural science can be said to make distinctive contributions to our knowledge of the 
nature of reality. However, neither domain can produce a complete knowledge of 
reality. That is, each of these domains gives us only an incomplete or partial 
knowledge of reality. This is what (ii) implies above—the second layer of the 
Integrationist Thesis. But what should be done to tackle the incompleteness problem 
implied by (ii)? The answer is proposed straightforwardly in (iii)—the third layer of 
the Integrationist Thesis. What is being proposed here concerns the interdependency 
between metaphysics and natural science. That is, metaphysics and natural science are 
not self–sufficient. Hence, they need each other. Given the three layers that make up 
the Integrationist Thesis, it seems a strong case can be made for the importance as well 
as the necessity of mutual cooperation between the subject matter M and the subject 
matter S.   
But defenders of the Strict Empiricist Thesis consider the marriage between 
metaphysics and natural science as deeply misguided at best and a non–starter at 
worst. We can see why this is the case by analyzing the three layers that make up the 
Strict Empiricist Thesis: (a) speculativeness, (b) superiority, and (c) unverifiability. In 
the case of (a), Immanuel Kant’s assessment of the subject matter M takes center stage. 
In his Critique of Pure Reason (1996, Avii:5ff; Bxv: 20 and Bxvii: 21–22), Kant claims that 
human reason plays a key role in helping us tackle fundamental questions about 
reality. However, Kant claims that human reason has severe limitations and thus, fails 
to uncover the nature of reality that goes beyond the boundary of experience. In light 
of this, Kant deems traditional (Aristotelian) metaphysics as a purely speculative 
discipline that does not afford us access to a mind–independent reality in and of itself.4  
In the case of (b), the subject matter S (natural science) is said to enjoy unparalleled 
epistemic superiority over that of the subject matter M (metaphysics). That means that 
given (b), the subject matter M loses its independence in the sense discussed earlier. In 
this case, the subject matter M ends up being either identified with or reduced to the 
subject matter S (see e.g., Quine 1969: Ch. 3; Ladyman and Ross 2007: 1; Ross, Ladyman, 
and Kincaid, 2013). In the case of (c) the subject matter M is said to lack empirical 
verification. For example, one of the key defenders of logical positivism,5 A. J. Ayer 
argues that the principle of verification utilizes certain criteria by which it can be 
decided if a sentence is meaningful. If a certain claim fails to meet a verification 
criterion, then it would be deemed as lacking meaning. So, unless metaphysical 
 
4 See also Loux and Crisp (2017, 1–9). Cf. Hilary Putnam’s and Michael Dummett’s anti–realism in 
Loux and Crisp (2017, Ch. 11).  
5 This is a 20th century movement originated in Vienna, Austria carrying the name ‘Vienna Circle’. 
Its key founders include Rudolph Carnap, Herbert Feigel, Otto Neurath, Moritz Schlick and Friedrich 
Waisman. Outside the Vienna Circle, defenders of this movement include thinkers such as A. J. Ayer 
and Ernest Nagel.  




statements describe what could be experienced or observable, they have no literal 
meaning (Ayer 1946). Similarly, Rudolf Carnap dismisses what he calls ‘external 
questions’6 that lie at the heart of traditional metaphysics as lacking in cognitive 
content (Carnap 1950, 20–40; see also Leitgeb and Carus 2020, section 1.4; Price 2009). 
Given the three layers that make up the Strict Empiricist Thesis, it seems that the subject 
matter M has no role to play in uncovering the nature of reality. That means that the 
subject matter S wins the day!   
Contra the Strict Empiricist Thesis, in this paper, I will argue that the independence 
of the subject matter M remains intact and thus, it can enter into two–way 
communication with the subject matter S. Taken this way, metaphysics and natural 
science are allies as opposed to being foes. I defend the Integrationist Thesis within the 
framework of E. J. Lowe's conception of metaphysics and its relation to natural 
science. In doing so, my main goal is to extend Lowe’s conception of metaphysics to 
develop a realist account of certain core theological claims. The paper is divided up as 
follows. In section 1, I will discuss Lowe’s view of metaphysics. In section 2, I will 
explain how Lowe thinks metaphysics and natural science are related. In section 3, I 
will respond to objections against Lowe’s conception of metaphysics. In section 4, I 
will discuss the implications of Lowe’s conception of metaphysics for a realist account 
of theological claims or discourse. In section 5, I will conclude this paper by claiming 
that there are excellent reasons to extend the synergy between metaphysics and 
natural science to that of theology as well.  
 
1. Lowe on Metaphysics and its Possibility 
 
Lowe develops his conception of metaphysics against the backdrop of the 
Integrationist Thesis (see e.g., Lowe 1998, Ch. 1; 2002, Ch. 1; 2006, Chaps. 1– 2 & 8– 10 
and 2009, Ch. 1). Recall that one of the central aspects of the Integrationist Thesis is the 
claim that the subject matter M and the subject matter S each has epistemic 
independence in the investigation of the nature of reality. For Lowe, metaphysics is 
the most fundamental or basic form of rational inquiry. Such rational inquiry can be 
carried out, as Lowe sees it, using distinctive methods and criteria of validation that 
are unique to metaphysics. Here Lowe’s point reinforces the epistemic independence 
of the subject matter M. But what precisely is metaphysics? Lowe does not attempt to 
define metaphysics. This is because no single definition of metaphysics can be offered 
to guarantee its reception by different metaphysical systems. For example, as Lowe 
points out, certain metaphysical systems may recognize the reality of space and 
causation whilst others deny such things. It is equally problematic, as Lowe claims, to 
specify the subject matter of metaphysics by coming up with a list of topics that are 
said to uniquely belong to it. At this point, a question could be asked as to what 
 
6 External questions deal with such things as properties, numbers, propositions and classes. For an 
excellent discussion on Carnap’s anti–metaphysical project, see Tuomas E. Tahko, Ch. 3 (Ph.D. Thesis, 
2008).    




distinguishes metaphysics from other disciplines. For Lowe, this question can be 
answered by showing how the concerns of the subject matter M and the concerns of the 
subject matter S do coincide. That means that in tackling the concerns in question, real 
progress could only be made if mutual cooperation exists between the two domains. 
For Lowe, as we shall see, such cooperation is not optional given that all empirical 
science presupposes metaphysics. 
Lowe claims that the conception of metaphysics that is worth exploring is the one 
that has traditionally been characterized as the systematic study of the most fundamental 
structure of reality. As we have already seen, this conception of metaphysics was 
introduced by Aristotle. Lowe’s own conception of metaphysics emerges out of 
traditional metaphysics. However, Lowe recognizes that traditional metaphysics faces 
many skeptics. Lowe claims that Kant called into question the very possibility of 
traditional metaphysics. It is not a coincidence that Lowe entitled his highly influential 
1998 book, The Possibility of Metaphysics.7 This title stands as a direct counter–response 
to Kant’s question, “How is Metaphysics Possible?” (Critique of Pure Reason, B.22). 
Lowe thinks that Kant’s question paved the way for serious anti–metaphysical views.8 
 
1.1. The Possibility of Metaphysics 
 
Is metaphysics possible? Lowe’s answer to this question is enthusiastically 
affirmative. Lowe believes that reasonable answers can be given for questions we ask 
regarding the fundamental nature of reality. In making such a claim, Lowe also makes 
it clear that metaphysical answers in question are more fundamental than the ones 
attributed to empirical science. Yet Lowe claims that metaphysics all by itself does not 
tell us what there is. In this case, the role of metaphysics is to tell us what there could 
be (i.e., possible). Once metaphysics plays its part in telling us what is possible, 
experience plays its part in telling us which of the metaphysical possibilities in 
question are true in actuality. Lowe claims that what is actual implies what is possible. 
Lowe’s point here can be expressed counterfactually. That is, if X had not been 
possible, then X would not have been actual, in the first place. In short, X is actual 
because X is possible. For Lowe, the experience cannot play its part in determining 
 
7 See also Lowe’s conception of metaphysics as a science of essence in Carruth, Gibb and Heil (2018, 
Ch.1). For some important defences of the traditional Aristotelian metaphysics, see Tahko (2013) and 
Oderberg (1999).  
8 As already pointed out earlier, Kant entirely rejected the Aristotelian realist approach to the subject 
matter M. But before giving his own answer to Kant’s question, Lowe assesses four views that challenge 
traditional realist metaphysics. First, relativism. On this view, notions such as objective truth and 
rationality/reason as mere cultural products. Second, scientism. On this view, only empirical sciences 
tell us about the fundamental nature of reality. Third, neo–Kantianism. At the heart of this view, lies the 
claim that metaphysics is incapable of uncovering facts about the nature of objective reality. Fourth, 
semanticism. On this view, metaphysical questions are said to be resolved based on the theory of 
meaning. Lowe argues that none of these views render metaphysical inquiry irrelevant or impossible 
(see for details Lowe 1998, 3–8). For a very informative analysis and critique of Michael Dummett’s 
view on semantical theory, see Loux and Crisp (2017, 310–323). 




what is actual if it is not already preceded by a metaphysical delimitation of what is 
possible. Lowe claims that metaphysics is both possible and necessary as a form of 
rational human inquiry. Lowe takes metaphysical possibility as an unavoidable 
prerequisite for actuality. For Lowe, the realm of metaphysical possibility is a genuine 
one. Such metaphysical possibility, as Lowe argues, must be assumed before 
experience establishes whether or not the things we investigate are actual. For Lowe, 
carrying out such a task is not something that should be left only for empirical 
sciences. This is because, for Lowe, empirical sciences only strive to establish what is 
the case in actuality—guided by experience. Since metaphysical possibility precedes 
what could be actual, Lowe argues that empirical sciences inescapably presuppose 
metaphysics.  
But Lowe claims that we should not equate metaphysical possibility with logical 
possibility. The latter possibility is simply a matter of a proposition or set of 
propositions respecting the laws of logic. That is, insofar as a given proposition is not 
contradictory, it can be said to be logically possible. But what lies at the heart of the 
metaphysical possibility is not following the rules of logic. Rather as Lowe points out, 
the metaphysical possibility is a possibility of a state of affairs. Philosophers call such 
possibility de re or a real possibility. Taken this way, metaphysical possibility concerns 
the possibility of real things. For example, Lowe claims that notions such as a state of 
affairs, an object, a property, a relation, an individual, a kind, a part, a substance, existence, 
identity, instantiation, possibility, necessity are first and foremost, ontological not logical 
notions. For Lowe, such notions concern being and its modes as opposed to formal 
properties and logical relations between propositions, as is the case with logic (see 
Lowe 1998: 10). In Lowe’s view, these sorts of metaphysical notions belong to the 
category of being, as Aristotle held. Lowe rejects Kant’s position which attributes such 
metaphysical notions to the categories of thought.9  
 
1.2. Possibility and Necessity 
 
Since possibility and necessity are interdefinable, Lowe extends this matter to show 
how metaphysical possibility is related to metaphysical necessity. Such discussion is 
also related to logical necessity. How is metaphysical necessity related to logical 
necessity given that the latter is often seen from the point of view of its application to 
the laws of logic? Here Lowe distinguishes three senses of logical necessity. First, there 
is strictly logical necessary which is said to be true based on only the laws of logic. 
Second, there is the narrowly logically necessary which is said to be true based on the 
laws of logic along with definitions of non–logical terms. Finally, there is the broadly 
 
9 Lowe does not assume that the sorts of things mentioned above (e.g., substance) can be established 
entirely a priori. for Lowe, all that we do a priori is, show what could be the case (i.e., possible). But 
establishing, say whether or not a substance is actual, requires us to depend on experience. Lowe also 
makes it clear that ‘categories’ are not just features rooted in the semantico–syntactic operations of 
natural language. Whilst recognizing the role of language in our attempt to grasp the fundamental 
structure of reality, for Lowe, metaphysical truths simply do not grow out of language.   




logically necessary which is said to be true in every logically possible world. In such 
a world, the laws of logic are said to hold up. Lowe claims that the broadly logical 
necessity directly coincides with metaphysical necessity. In fact, for Lowe, these two 
necessities can be considered to be identical despite having been described with two 
different names. In this case, Lowe aligns his view with philosophers such as Alvin 
Plantinga who also think along the same lines.10 But how can metaphysical necessity 
be known, a priori or a posteriori? For Lowe, metaphysical necessity is not known 
entirely a priori. This is because such necessity is not grounded in logic and concepts—
although logic itself is ultimately grounded in metaphysics. In Lowe’s view, 
metaphysical necessity is grounded in the ‘natures of things’ (Lowe 1998, 21). For 
example, to know what, say water or H2O is, a priori reflection alone would not be 
sufficient. It is equally the case that experience–based investigations do not tell us the 
complete story about the metaphysical underpinnings of water either (cf. Kripke 1980, 
35–38). Here Lowe’s view once again shows the centrality of the Integrationist Thesis in 
acknowledging both the independence and interdependence that underlie the subject 
matter M and the subject matter S. 
 
2. Lowe on Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science 
 
Lowe’s book–length argument for the centrality of metaphysics for natural science 
comes from his highly celebrated book entitled, The Four–Category Ontology: A 
Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science, (2006).   
 
2.1. Progress in Philosophy 
 
One of the distinctive aspects of Lowe’s four–category ontology concerns the 
possibility of making progress in philosophy in general and metaphysics, in 
particular. Lowe argues that progress in non–empirical disciplines such as 
mathematics and logic can be and has been made. Likewise, progress is achievable in 
philosophy despite its being a non–empirical discipline. Making progress in this 
regard, as Lowe argues, is rooted in the science of being. For Lowe, no special science 
can succeed in addressing its own ontological questions independently of the science 
of being. The reason for this, Lowe argues, is that reality is one and truth is indivisible.  
Assuming that ontology is an a priori science, how can we attain knowledge of reality 
in and of itself? Lowe answers this question by bifurcating the role of ontology into two 
parts, namely one is entirely a priori, and the other blends empirical input. Taken in its 
a priori sense, Lowe claims that ontology focuses on exploring the realm of 
metaphysical possibility. That is, in Lowe’s view, ontology seeks to establish the 
 
10 For Plantinga’s view on this issue, see his The Nature of Necessity (1974). But there are other 
philosophers who do not embrace such account of metaphysical necessity. See for example, Lowe’s 
discussion of Bob Hale’s view (Lowe 1998, 16–21). Lowe illustrates the three versions of logical necessity 
using the law of contradiction (see Lowe 1998, 14–16).   




categories of things that could exist and co–exist to make up a single possible world. 
Whereas the empirical aspect of ontology focuses on establishing the sorts of things 
that exist in the actual world. Such a task of ontology requires direct empirical 
evidence that is informed by most successful scientific theories. Lowe argues that the 
a priori and the empirical aspects of ontology are not independent—the empirical 
aspect of ontology depends on that of the a priori.11 Although ontological knowledge 
is not infallible, for Lowe, progress in metaphysics must be possible if we are to grasp 
features of reality. As Lowe sums up:  
 
Metaphysics can help both to underwrite some of the theories of empirical science and 
yet also to curb the wilder speculations of scientists and the ambitions of some of them 
to claim a monopoly of truth and understanding. Metaphysicians cannot afford to 
ignore developments in scientific theory, but they only promise to render themselves 
foolish in the eyes of posterity by slavishly accepting current scientific orthodoxy. 
(Lowe 2009, 7–8).12    
 
2.2. The Four Category Ontology 
 
Given his realist conception of ontology, Lowe takes ontological categories as 
categories of being as opposed to categories of thought. In Lowe’s view, categories 
themselves are neither entities nor do they constitute a distinctive ontological category 
of the category of category. In other words, for Lowe, categories are not themselves 
beings. That said, for Lowe, ontological categories of entities such as universals, 
particulars, and objects can be organized hierarchically albeit there is no universal 
consensus as to how such a task should be carried out (see e.g., Lowe 2002, 16; 2006, 
7– 8). Universals (e.g., redness) are said to be repeatable entities and hence can be 
instantiated by objects occupying multiple spatiotemporal locations. Particulars (e.g., 
tropes) are said to be non–repeatable entities and hence can only be instantiated by 
one object at any given time. Objects are said to be entities that bear properties.13  
Different ontological systems have different things to say in regard to how 
ontological categories are related to one another and also which categories could be 
fundamental. For Lowe, describing a certain ontological category as being 
fundamental boils down to showing “the existence and identity conditions of entities 
 
11 Lowe’s point is well taken. The a priori and a posteriori modes of knowledge are deeply 
interdependent, see also, Guta (2019a, 4–6). On controversies on a priori–a posteriori knowledge in 
epistemology, see Neta (2014).  
12 See also an excellent interview philosopher Tim Maudlin gave in the Scientific American in regard 
to progresses gained in philosophy in areas such as free will, morality and quantum mechanics (2018).  
13 Of course, properties also bear other properties. For example, the property of being pink has the 
second–order property of being a color property. Lowe thinks that what makes objects unique in the 
role that they play as possessors of properties comes down to the asymmetric relation that exists 
between the category of objects and the category of properties. An entity that belongs to the latter 
category is borne by the entity that belongs to the category of the former. But the converse does not 
hold true (see Lowe 2006, 9ff; for more details see, Loux and Crisp 2017, Chaps. 1 – 3). 




belonging to that category cannot be exhaustively specified in terms of ontological 
dependency relations between those entities and the entities belonging to other 
categories” (Lowe 2006, 8). As Lowe points out, ontologists do not speak in one voice 
as to what categories of entities exist as well as which ones are fundamental. In this 
case, Lowe lays out four competing ontological systems (Lowe 2006, 10). First, for 
some ontologists, only tropes constitute a fundamental category (see e.g., Campbell 
1990). Second, for some ontologists, only objects and universals are fundamental. Here 
tropes are rejected (see e.g., Armstrong 1997). Third, for some ontologists, only objects 
and tropes are fundamental. Here universals are rejected or reduced to classes of 
resembling tropes (see e.g., Martin 1980). Fourth, for some ontologists, objects, 
universal, and tropes are all fundamental while maintaining the ontological 
relationships they have with one another.  
The fourth position is one that Lowe himself advocates in his four–category 
ontology. In this case, Lowe develops a variant of the fourth position according to 
which, there are two fundamental categories of particulars—objects and tropes and 
two fundamental categories of universals—substantial universals or kinds and 
property–universals. For Lowe, instances of the substantial universals are objects 
(individual substances) whereas instances of the property–universals (attributes) are 
tropes or modes, as Lowe prefers to call them.14 In this view, attributes and modes are 
characterizing entities whereas individual substances and substantial kinds are 
characterizable entities. Moreover, substantial kinds and attributes are instantiable 
entities whereas individual substances and modes are instantiating entities. There is 
also an exemplification relation that obtains between individual substances and 
attributes or property universals (Lowe in Galluzzo and Loux 2015, 70–71).  
We can explain this view with an example. That is, Socrates is said to be an 
individual substance. Socrates is also a human. In this case, human is said to be a 
substantial kind/universal. So, in saying that Socrates is a human, we are implying 
that Socrates instantiates the substantial kind, human. In saying that Socrates is white, 
we are implying that Socrates is characterized by property–universal, whiteness. It is 
also the case that Socrates’s whiteness reflects the way Socrates is, that is, being white 
(mode). This mode in turn is an instance of an instantiation of a property–universal 
whiteness. There is also a relationship that is said to hold between Socrates and his 
whiteness. In this case, Socrates is said to exemplify the property whiteness. Put it 
differently, Socrates’ whiteness and the way Socrates is (say, being white), are 
characterizing entities whereas Socrates and his humanity are characterizable entities. 
Moreover, Socrates’ humanity and his whiteness are instantiable entities whereas 
Socrates and his being white are instantiating entities. Socrates is also said to relate to 
his whiteness by exemplifying it.   
 
14 Lowe recognizes that the roots of this view can be traced back to Aristotle’s Categories (see Lowe 
in Galluzzo and Loux 2015, 70). Lowe also includes relations in the category of non–substantial property 
universals.  




Lowe sums up his four–category ontology using what he calls, the ontological square 
(Lowe in Galluzzo and Loux 2015, 71; see also Lowe 2006, 18 and 2009,10):  
 
Substantial                characterized by                   Non–substantial universal 










Individual                 characterized by                                     Modes 
Substances 
 
Figure 1. Ontological Square  
 
2.3. The Advantages of the Four–Category Ontology  
 
One of the key advantages of the four–category ontology, as Lowe argues, concerns 
the role it plays in providing a metaphysical foundation for natural science. In this 
case, the four–category ontology is said to provide a better way to account for the 
ontological status of the laws of nature. As is well known, there is a long–standing 
traditional interpretation of the laws of nature associated with David Hume—the 
Regularity View of Laws (Psillos 2002, 8–10). In this view, the laws of nature are said 
to be regularities. But the problem with this conception of the laws of nature is that 
not all regularities are said to be causal nor can they be taken as laws of nature. For 
example, even though the night regularly follows the day, no day causes the night. 
Moreover, simply because, say, Americans regularly carry credit cards in their 
pockets, we will not be justified if we were to assume that the habit in question 
constitutes the law of nature. So, in light of such considerations, it is said that a 
distinction has to be made between the good regularities that are said to constitute the 
laws of nature and the bad regularities that are said to fail to constitute the laws of 
nature and hence, are merely accidental. Only regularities that constitute the laws of 
nature are said to play a role in causation and explanation (see also Rosenberg 2012, 
Ch. 4). But there is no consensus among philosophers as to whether the regularity 
view of laws is sustainable even if assuming that it could be distinguished from merely 
accidental generalizations.15 Philosophers also suggest that statements of laws can be 
spelled out in terms of counterfactual conditionals of the form, say, ‘If X were the case, 
 
15 For a highly influential critique of the regularity view of the laws of nature, see Armstrong (1983). 
Also see Psillos (2002, Ch. 5).  




then Y would be the case’. Analyzing causal statements counterfactually is said to 
allow us to distinguish real laws from mere accidental generalizations (see Rosenberg 
2012, 63–64).    
Details aside, central to Lowe’s account of the laws of nature is the connection he 
introduces between the laws and universals. By universals, Lowe means both 
substantial kinds and non–substantial properties (including relations). According to 
Lowe, the laws of nature consist in, not regularities, but relations between universals. 
Lowe illustrates this point using Kepler’s first law—‘Planets move in elliptical orbits’. 
For Lowe, “the law consists in the fact that the property of moving in an elliptical orbit 
characterizes the kind planet”, (2006, 16). Lowe distinguishes his view from a similar 
well–known David Armstrong’s account of the laws of nature. Unlike Lowe, 
Armstrong requires a second–order necessitation to obtain between the first–order 
properties of, say being a plant and moving in elliptical orbits (see for details Lowe 
2006, 130–132). Moreover, for Lowe, law statements can be spelled out dispositionally. 
For example, the predicate, ‘move in elliptical orbits’ is dispositional in force. This is 
because the law indicates how planets are disposed to move owing to the gravitational 
force of the sun. Lowe also argues that some laws are relational, say, the attraction 
between electrons and protons.  
Lowe also claims that the four–category ontology better handles the distinction 
between dispositional and occurrent or categorical states of objects, say, the solubility 
of salt (sodium chloride) in water. Lowe argues that analyzing such disposition 
statements counterfactually will not be successful, since there will always be factors 
that would prohibit the manifestation of a given dispositional property in question.16 
But in Lowe’s view, “an object possesses a disposition to F just in case it instantiates a 
kind which is characterized by the property of being F” (Lowe 2006, 17). In light of 
this, Lowe further notes that to say that an object O has the disposition to be dissolved 
in water is to say that O instantiates a kind, K. That is, the law obtains that water 
dissolves K. On the other hand, for Lowe, “an object is occurrently F just in case it 
possesses a mode which is an instance of the property of being F, that is, a mode of a 
universal Fness” (2006, 17). Central to the analysis of the occurrent states of objects, as 
Lowe claims, is relational modes. For Lowe, the analysis of the occurrent state of an 
object O, say, salt being dissolved by some water happens, just in case, salt and water 
are related by a mode which is said to be an instance of a universal relation of 
dissolution (Ibid.). So ultimately, for Lowe, the distinction between the dispositional 
and the occurrent underlies the distinction between the domain of universals and the 
domain of particulars.  
In Lowe’s view, only objects of occurrent states are accessible for perception 
whereas its dispositions are not. Lowe claims that the perceptible aspects of objects 
are their modes or their particular ‘ways of being’ which allows them to be in various 
occurrent states, say, F-dissolving. By contrast, Lowe claims that the objects’ 
 
16 See my extended discussion of dispositional properties and their manifestations, see Guta (2019b, 
124–134).  




dispositional states are rooted in instantiating kinds which are characterized by 
various non–substantial property universals. Moreover, Lowe claims that the four–
category ontology is better placed to show us what ties together particular properties 
(i.e., modes) of an object. For example, if we want to point out an object’s modes, all 
we have to do is point out an object’s features or aspects that underlie the particular 
ways it is. So given his four–category ontology, Lowe claims that an object exemplifies 
a property P in one of the following ways. In a situation where an object O instantiates 
a kind K which is characterized by P, it is said that O exemplifies P dispositionally. On 
the other hand, in a situation where O is said to be characterized by a mode M which 
instantiates P, it is said that O exemplifies P occurently.  
Finally, Lowe extends the application of his four–category ontology to modern 
physics, particularly to general relativity and quantum mechanics. As Lowe remarks: 
 
Nothing hinders us from saying, if need be, that relativistic space–time has the status 
of an individual substance or object, with the consequence, perhaps, that entities that 
we are ordinarily apt to regard as objects—such as material bodies—are ‘really’ just 
spatiotemporally continuous successions of space–time modes. This is a view of the 
material world which, indeed, is prefigured in the metaphysical system of Spinoza. 
Again, we need not take a stand on the issue of whether the ontology of quantum 
entities as particles—a kind of object—or as modes of quantized field. Either way, the 
four–category ontology will admit of application. (Lowe 2006, 19) 
 
Lowe claims that it is not the business of metaphysics to dictate empirical science as 
to how it should categorize the theoretical entities it postulates to exist. But it is 
metaphysics that provides the categories. But when it comes to how best to implement 
such categories in the construction of scientific theories is something that should be 
left for practicing scientists to decide. But for Lowe, the constraints imposed by the 
categories in question still must be respected by empirical science. For Lowe, as long 
as empirical science invokes the laws of nature for explanatory purposes thereby 
seeking to garner empirical evidence, the four–category ontology provides it with an 
adequate metaphysical framework. As Lowe argues, the scientific enterprise cannot 
be grounded in any special science but in the general science of being (ontology). It is 
clear then that for Lowe, the Integrationist Thesis that consists of both the subject matter 
M and the subject matter S is a defensible conception when it comes to a synergy 
between metaphysics and natural science.17   
 
3. Objections and Replies  
 
Here we will briefly look at two relevant objections against Lowe’s Integrationist Thesis.  
Objection # 1: in their Everything Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized (2007; see also Ross 
et al.  2013), Don Ross, James Ladyman, and David Spurrett raised what I call, a two–
 
17 For a detailed defence of metaphysical foundation for natural science, see Lowe (2006, Part III).  




pronged objection against Lowe’s conception of metaphysics: (a) the possibility of 
metaphysics, and (b) the methodology and independence of metaphysics.  
Concerning (a) they claim,  
 
according to Lowe, it is the job of metaphysics to tell us what is possible, but he 
concedes that which of the possible fundamental structures of reality exist can be 
answered only with empirical evidence… However, we differ with Lowe on how this 
task is to be accomplished because we deny that a priori inquiry can reveal what is 
metaphysically possible. (2007,16)  
 
Again, they claim, “we have no good reasons for thinking that a priori metaphysical 
knowledge is possible”, (2007, 7). Alternatively, they propose, “Let us just stipulate, 
then, that inquiry into the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics is 
‘metametaphysics’. Then naturalistic metametaphysics, we hold, should be based on 
naturalistic metaphysics, which should in turn be based on science” (Ibid., 6).  
Concerning (b) they claim,  
 
According to him [Lowe]… metaphysics studies… identity, necessity, causation, space 
and time. Metaphysics must say what these concepts are and then address 
fundamental questions involving them… systematize the relations among 
fundamental metaphysical categories such as things, events, properties, and so on. We 
might reasonably ask how we could proceed with these tasks. Lowe follows Frank 
Jackson (1998) and many others in advocating the familiar methodology of reflecting 
on our concepts (conceptual analysis). But why should we think that the products of 
this sort of activity reveal anything about the deep structure of reality? (2007, 15–16) 
  
Reply: The two–pronged objection as stated above in (a) and (b) aims to disentangle 
the Integrationist Thesis that is said to glue the subject matter of M and the subject matter 
of S.  The objection in question arms the subject matter of S to have an upper hand over 
that of the subject matter M. But for this goal to be achievable, Ross, Ladyman, and 
Spurrett must show us how natural science (physics, in particular) can establish the 
realm of possibilities that Lowe insists belongs only to the domain of metaphysics. For 
example, suppose that a particle physicist and a metaphysician engage in a lively 
conversation as to what makes an electron to be what it is. In this conversation, we 
expect, inter alia, a physicist to say that an electron is an elementary particle with 
features such as a negative charge, spin, and mass. But when a metaphysician gets her 
turn, she claims that while a scientific account of the features of an electron is very 
informative, it nevertheless is silent on one important question. That is, in virtue of 
what an electron is said to have the features in question? A physicist may admit that 
she is not sure what insight physics proper gives us into answering this question. As 
the philosopher of physics, Tim Maudlin insightfully observes, “an astonishing 
amount of physics can proceed without answers to these [sorts] of questions” (2012, 
xi). As Maudlin further remarks,  





it is characteristic of a contemporary physics education that much more time is spent 
learning how to solve the equation and get practical answer…than discussing the more 
“philosophical” questions about the nature of heat, or the nature of space and time, or 
the nature of matter. (Ibid. xii)  
 
Here Maudlin’s remarks strengthen our earlier observation in regard to why a 
physicist’s answer to the features of an electron tells us only an incomplete story. This 
opens up a need for physics or natural science, in general, to team up with 
metaphysics to get as much complete picture as possible as to what the nature of an 
electron is. In this spirit, our metaphysician could answer the question raised earlier 
by saying that an electron has the features that it has in virtue of instantiating the kind, 
electronhood, or substantial universal. In any case, such an answer is not available within 
natural science itself. Similar reasoning and conclusion can be advanced to other 
features of reality, say causation, identity, necessity, properties, events, space and 
time.  
But Ross, Ladyman, and Spurrett passionately reject the role of a priori metaphysics 
assumed here. For them, metaphysics cannot play such a role in uncovering aspects 
of reality. Instead, the metaphysical claim that they say worth taking seriously is one 
they describe as naturalistic metaphysics. They explain the gist of their naturalistic 
metaphysics through what they call the Principle of Naturalistic Closure (PNC):  
 
Any new metaphysical claim that is to be taken seriously at time t should be motivated 
by, and only by, the service it would perform, if true, in showing how two or more 
specific scientific hypotheses, at least one of which is drawn from fundamental 
physics, jointly explain more than the sum of what is explained by the two hypotheses 
taken separately. (2007, 37)   
 
Central to PNC is the idea that metaphysics’ sole role is unifying two or more scientific 
hypotheses. But what evidence is there within science that shows that the role of 
metaphysics is nothing but playing the role of unifying hypotheses? Recently, as 
Tuomas Tahko argued in his, Unity of Science (2021, 40–64), establishing the unity of 
science requires a robust metaphysical/ontological framework. In Tahko’s discussion, 
Lowe’s four–category ontology plays a key role. Since PNC strips metaphysics of such 
an ontological basis, it remains entirely unclear what motivates it as a solution to 
ensure the unity of science. As stated, PNC does not even seem to satisfy its own 
standard. Notice that proponents of PNC reject a priori metaphysics. But PNC does 
not seem to escape a prioricity in the way it is supposed to function. Playing the role 
of unifying different scientific hypotheses can only be accomplished by employing an 
apriori approach. If this is true, then PNC is no less a priori metaphysics as traditional 
metaphysics is. Again, if this observation is true, then PNC seems to be self–defeating 
unless there is a reason to think that it operates on a purely a posteriori basis. But I am 
unable to see what this reason could be.   




Similarly, Ross’s, Ladyman’s, and Spurrett’s claim that inquiry into the 
metaphysical possibility or impossibility being a metametaphysical18 matter is also 
something that can only be dealt with via a priori means. There is nothing within 
science itself that establishes an a priori approach presupposed by PNC. If I am right 
about this, why embrace a prioricity in the case of PNC (naturalistic metaphysics) but 
deny it in the case of traditional metaphysics? Finally, identifying Lowe’s analytic 
metaphysics with conceptual analysis is highly misleading. Although Lowe 
recognizes the role of conceptual analysis, he categorically denies that in doing 
metaphysics, he is after conceptual analysis in the manner of Frank Jackson (1998).19 
Rather for Lowe, doing metaphysics is an intellectual exercise to discover truths about 
reality. That said, for Lowe, such discovery of truths about reality involves both 
metaphysics and science. So, for the objections in (a) and (b) to have any chance of 
succeeding, a non–metaphysics presupposing counter–evidence needs to be produced 
from within science against Lowe’s Integrationist Thesis. As I see it, such scientific 
evidence is non–existent.    
Objection # 2: In his essay entitled, “Ambitious, Yet Modest, Metaphysics’’, 
Thomas Hofweber (2009, Ch. 9) describes the greatest threat to metaphysics as a 
philosophical discipline. As he explains,  
 
the questions that metaphysics tries to answer have long been answered in other 
parts of inquiry, ones that have much greater authority. And if they haven’t been 
answered yet then one should not look to philosophy for an answer. What 
metaphysics tries to do has been or will be done by the sciences. There is nothing left 
to do for philosophy, or so the worry. (2009, 260)  
 
Hofweber claims that there is one radical attempt to save metaphysics in light of the 
objection under consideration. In this case, Hofweber claims that Lowe’s metaphysics 
is representative of a radical way given that it strongly assumes that metaphysics 
provides a foundation for natural science as discussed in section 2. Hofweber calls 
Lowe’s Integrationist Thesis (i.e., the relationship between metaphysics and the 
sciences) the immodest attitude. Hofweber calls Lowe’s conception of metaphysics 
immodest because, given such a view, metaphysics is given greater importance than 
it actually deserves (2009, 263).   
Reply: There are several ways one can go about responding to Hofweber’s 
objection as outlined above. Here I am only interested in exploring one response. The 
objection implies that science is a self–sufficient domain of human inquiry. In this case, 
a defender of such a view of science seems to be setting herself up to assume a serious 
burden of proof to establish that no questions that arise in the domain of metaphysics 
 
18 Metametaphysics is the study of metaphysics itself. In other words, it is a second–order study of 
first–order issues (questions) that arise in metaphysics proper. See for detailed discussions, see 
Chlamers, Manley and Wasserman, eds., (2009); Tahko (2015); Williamson (2007).  
19 See my critique of Jackson’s ‘serious metaphysics and the location problem’ (Guta 2011:35–58). Cf. 
Willaimson (2018: Ch.4).  




have independent relevance. But if it turns out to be the case that there are aspects of 
reality that can be handled better within the metaphysical domain than that of a 
scientific one, then the central claim of Hofweber’s objection will be severely 
undermined.  
To illustrate this point, I briefly discuss Joseph Melia’s excellent argument that 
shows why scientific theory at any level of progress inevitably lacks answers for 
certain kinds of questions. In his Modality (2003, 1–2), Melia asks us to entertain the 
following scenario. Suppose that we happen to have a greatly comprehensive and 
accurate theory of the world. Moreover, the language of this theory is said to contain 
a name for every object and every single thing. This theory leaves out nothing, say the 
black holes of the furthest galaxies, even the fine spider web swaying in the corner of 
the attic. Moreover, the theory contains a predicate for every instantiated simple or 
complex categorical property. The theory gives details as to what things are like to the 
highest level. For example, it tells us if something has a mass of 1.153 kg, if it has a 
charge of 4.238322 coulombs and if it has a length of √𝟐 meters. Furthermore, Melia 
asks us to suppose that finally, everything the theory states is true. The theory 
accurately reports the shapes, sizes, masses, and charges of every fundamental particle 
in my finger. In short, everything in the theory is true. 
But as Melia notes, many salient questions need to be asked regarding such a 
surprisingly complete theory. That is, does every truth appear within the theory? 
Would the theory account for every single matter of fact? If such a theory ever came 
to be written down, could thinkers and scientists finally rest from their work? What 
more could one do or say? What else could there be to add? Melia claims that many 
philosophers wouldn’t accept such a theory to be a theory of everything. This is 
because there is a class of truths concerning which the theory in question remains 
silent. This is the case, as Melia correctly claims, that the theory in question lacks the 
resources needed to describe such truths.  
Melia explains this point by asking us to consider the following sorts of claims: 
“John is short” and “John is human”. Both of these claims have a subject–predicate 
form. Each is said to attribute a categorial property to John. However, the ontological 
status of each of these claims is not equivalent. That is, the first claim attributes an 
accidental property to John whereas the second claim attributes an essential property 
to John. But there is an important difference between these two kinds of properties. 
For example, John can lack an accidental property of his current short height without 
ceasing to exist. John can grow a few inches taller than he currently is. But no such 
compromise is possible when it comes to Jonh’s essential property. That is, John 
cannot exist if, say, he loses his humanity or being human. This is because being human 
is an essential property John must have to exist. But such class of truths as Melia 
rightly claims do not figure into the alleged theory of everything in question. There is 
no empirical way to establish such truths. So, contra Hofweber, there is a class of 
truths on which natural science renders us no help at all. Since such a class of truths 
exists, as Lowe argues, metaphysics is the domain of inquiry where such truths receive 
proper treatment. In light of such considerations, Lowe’s conception of metaphysics 




hardly constitutes an immodest attitude, as Hofweber claims. Rather it is defending 
the view of science advocated by Hofweber that constitutes an immodest attitude. 
This is because such a view of science entails a strong form of scientism, which is self–
defeating. It is self–defeating because to say that science is the only source of reliable 
knowledge is a straightforward philosophical thesis for which no empirical basis is 
available to justify it.20 In other words, the problem here is conferring upon science the 
status it does not even have. It remains entirely unclear to me, therefore, what 
motivates Hofweber’s objection against Lowe’s conception of metaphysics. In section 
4, we will have more examples that show us why we should be wary of both sorts of 
objections considered here.  
 
4. A Realist Account of Theological Claims  
 
The question of whether the discipline of theology is a rational, independent domain 
of inquiry into the nature of reality continues to stir intellectually stimulating 
conversations. Some of these conversations question both the metaphysical and the 
epistemic basis of theological claims as having cognitive content. Taken from the 
standpoint of metaphysics, theological claims are said to fail to correspond to a mind–
independent reality. Similarly, taken from the epistemic standpoint, theological claims 
are said to lack the proper methodology of verification. Such skepticism expressed 
toward theological discourse is often advanced against the backdrop of scientific 
achievements. In this case, the veiled message of the skeptics in question is that 
theological discourse faces both problems of verifiability and reliability. In contrast, 
natural science is said to have no such defects given that it constantly updates itself in 
light of ever–growing advances.21 Does this mean that theological realism is doomed 
to fail? Can science dictate how theological discourse should take place or advance? 
Is science qualified to pass a verdict on whether or not theological discourse 
constitutes a genuine form of knowledge concerning reality? In short, is the fate of 
theology in the hand of natural science? These are the sorts of questions I will try to 
tackle in this final section of my paper. But first I will begin my discussion with a 




20 For an excellent discussion on scientism and the problems associated with it, see Moreland (2018).  
21 Historically an important German theologian who suggested demythologizing the New 
Testament in light of the scientific age is Rudolf Bultmann (see Bultmann, 1961). Similarly, a 
philosopher David Hume dismissed the New Testament miracles as impossible accounts due to their 
clash with the laws of nature, see Peter Millican, ed. (2007: section X). Both Bultmann and Hume made 
a huge impact in their respective disciplines. However, it is still an open question whether they were 
successful in changing minds across the board. I remain highly doubtful of the plausibility of their 
views.  




4.1. Theology and Theological Claims 
 
By ‘theology’ I mean specifically, Christian theology. As is well–known, Christian 
theology contains within it incredibly diverse traditions and theological hermeneutic. 
But getting into these discussions is not relevant for present purposes. Instead, my 
focus will be on the central theological claims that all parties on a theological spectrum 
largely embrace despite the existing differences. So, what are these theological claims 
that the parties in question may coalesce around?   
Here I follow Alvin Plantinga’s excellent characterization of Christian belief in his 
Warranted Christian Belief (2000, Vii). For Plantinga, Christian belief encompasses the 
great creeds embraced by the main branches of the Christian church. In this case, 
Plantinga mentions Christian thinkers such as Calvin and Aquinas, Luther and 
Augustine, Mennon Simons and Karl Barth, Mother Theresa and St. Maximus the 
Confessor, Billy Graham and St. Gregory Palamas. These Christian thinkers are said 
to represent classical Christian belief. For Plantinga, the Christian belief consists of 
two components, namely the theistic component of the Christian belief and the uniquely 
Christian component respectively. I present these two components (with minor 
revision) as follows:   
 
A. Theistic component 
 
1. There is such a person as God. 
2. God is a person—a being with intellect and will. 
3. A person has (or can have) knowledge and belief, including affections, 
loves, hates, intentions, and a capacity to act to execute them. 
4. God has some knowledge, power, and love to the maximum degree. 
5. God is all–knowing, all–powerful, perfectly good, and wholly loving.  
6. God created the universe and regularly upholds and providentially 
guides it.  
 
B. Uniquely Christian component 
 
7. Human beings are mired in rebellion and sin.  
8. Human beings need deliverance and salvation.  
9. God has arranged ways for human beings to receive deliverance through 
the sacrificial suffering, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 
10. Jesus is both a man and a uniquely divine son of God.  
 
The claims in the domain (A) can be grouped into (i) personhood–focused claims (1)–
(3); (ii) attribute–focused claims (4)–(5); and (iii) an action–focused claim (6). Similarly, 




the claims in the domain (B) can be grouped into (iv) human condition–focused claims 
(7)–(8) and (v) a solution–focused claim (9) and an identity–focused claim (10).22 
The first thing we need to keep in mind in regard to theological claims is the fact 
that they strongly presuppose realism. The term ‘realism’ is used in so many different 
ways (see e.g., Brock and Mares, 2007). But in the present context, I use it in a more 
restricted sense. In this case, realism applied to the theological claims entails that the 
claims in question are assertions about something real or some state of affairs that 
obtain. These factual statements can also be stated in the form of subject–predicate 
statements, as shown in the examples above. Setting aside the question of whether all 
predicates play a referential role, the theological claims in question are taken to be (or, 
at least, supposed to be) referentially secure. That is, the predicates of such theological 
claims are said to have referents. That is, they are about something/someone real. So, 
the extension of the predicates of the theological claims in question are not empty, say, 
as the predicates of the statements such as, ‘Moses is twenty feet tall’ are. As far as we 
know, no human being ever lived who satisfied the predicate ‘is twenty feet tall.’23  
By contrast, consider one of the theological claims, Jesus is both a man and a uniquely 
divine son of God. For this theological claim to have any serious significance, the reality 
of Jesus must be assumed. But this does not mean that Jesus’ reality is contingent on 
us assuming that he is real. If that were the case, such reasoning would open up a can 
of worms for all sorts of things to claim the status of being real. That is, just by 
assuming that X is the case, we would conclude that X is real. But counterexamples 
for such reasoning are not hard to come by. For example, consider the statement, ‘the 
present king of France is bald’. But the subject term (definite description) of this 
statement does not denote or pick out a real, concrete human king. This is because 
France has no king. So, no amount of imagining or assuming would cause the present 
king of France to exist. Therefore, the state of affairs of France having a king does not 
obtain. But since the theological claims/statements in question are said to be grounded 
 
22 Plantinga’s two components raise a question concerning whether theistic God is the same as that 
of the Christian God. For example, in her Aquinas Lecture (2016) entitled: ‘‘The God of the Bible and 
the God of Philosophers,’’ Eleonore Stump addresses this very question. Stump claims that it is not 
uncommon among theologians and philosophers to assume that the God of the Bible is radically 
different from that of the God of classical theism that the philosophers talk about. As Stump points out, 
the God of the philosophers is said to be identified by standard attributes mentioned in the domain (A) 
particularly (4)–(5). But Stump makes a strong case against a bifurcation introduced in regard to the 
God of the Bible and the God of classical theism. For Stump, no such bifurcation is sustainable. So, 
Stump argues that the God of classical theism is identical to that of the personal biblical God (2016, 19). 
I, too, will not make any distinction between the God of classical theism and the God of the Bible. But 
it is not relevant for my present purpose to advance this discussion any further (see further Stump 
2016). Unless otherwise stated, in the rest of this paper, I do not refer to Plantinga’s two components 
separately. Instead, I simply refer to them as theological claims. I thank Stump for sending me a printed 
copy of her Aquinas Lecture delivered at the Philosophy Department at Marquette University.  
23 For controversies on this and similar other issues having to do with singular terms and whether 
they play  genuine referential roles, see Lycan (2000).  




in reality, they enjoy an ontological status that is different from that of 
statements/claims such as ‘the present King of France is bald.’  
So, assuming that theological realism and the sorts of theological claims in question 
are inextricably linked, what grounds the supposed realism? This question brings us 
to the second important matter that we need to keep in mind in regard to theological 
claims. Here I have in mind, the source of epistemic justification. Joining other 
philosophers, by ‘epistemic justification’ I mean, ‘‘the property ascribed to a belief in 
virtue of satisfying certain evaluative norms concerning what a person ought to 
believe” (Honderich 1995, 434). Epistemologists have long argued that knowledge 
requires satisfying three necessary and sufficient conditions, namely justification, belief, 
and truth. In light of this, knowledge has been defined as justified, true, belief.  
Of course, in the wake of Edmund Gettier’s (1993) counterexamples,24 most, if not 
all, philosophers nowadays think that the supposed three conditions mentioned above 
count only as necessary but not as sufficient conditions for knowledge. So, we have 
an incomplete definition of knowledge. That is, knowledge is justified true belief + 
________. What goes into this blank remains to be everyone’s guess. But the concept 
of justification has been spelled in various ways. For example, according to 
foundationalism, properly basic beliefs confer justification for non–basic beliefs. But 
properly basic beliefs themselves are not based on other beliefs. According to 
coherentism, epistemic justification consists of a web of mutually supporting beliefs. 
According to reliabilism, epistemic justification is rooted in a reliable process or 
method that makes true beliefs possible. Moreover, traditional epistemology is said to 
be thoroughly a priori in its modus operandi. But owing to its a priori nature, it faces 
epistemic skepticism. This is a denial of the possibility of attaining knowledge via purely 
an a priori means. It was largely due to concerns related to epistemic skepticism that 
Quine famously proposed naturalizing epistemology, i.e., reduce it to or identify it 
with empirical psychology (see Quine 1969, Ch.3).  
But what is the source of epistemic justification for theological claims? Although a 
lot of what has been said about epistemic justification applies to theological claims, in 
my view, the mere a priori method won’t do. In saying this, however, I am not 
implying that theological claims should not be approached via an a priori means. Of 
course, they should! But as I see it, such an a priori method has no primary importance. 
There is something else that takes the driver’s seat. In this case, I have in mind ‘divine 
revelation’. Following theologians and Christian philosophers, I understand that the 
divine revelation takes two forms, one general and the other specific. The former 
pertains to creation taken as a whole whereas the latter pertains to the Holy Scriptures 
and the Incarnate Christ. Each version of this divine revelation has been and still is a 
 
24 Edmund Geitter argued that the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief only 
gives us necessary conditions for knowledge. We have yet to come up with a sufficient condition. No 
resolution has been reached yet on what qualifies as a sufficient condition (see for details Geitter 1963; 
Feldman, 2003). For an excellent book on epistemic justification, see Alston (1989).  




subject of stimulating intellectual discussions. For present purposes, I do not revisit 
these discussions.25  
In the order of ontology, it is the divine revelation that provides a primary source of 
epistemic justification for theological claims. Only secondarily, that is, on an epistemic 
level, an a priori reason can be said to play its part. Put differently, in the tradition of 
Christian thinkers such as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas, faith and reason come 
together to link ontology and epistemology (see e.g., John Paul II 1998). It is the faith–
reason framework that underlies epistemic justification for theological claims. Of 
course, this does not mean that theological claims do not enjoy epistemic justification 
outside of the faith–reason framework. Quite the contrary. For example, the domain 
of the theological claims spills over into a second–order discipline such as the 
philosophy of religion. Here issues as diverse as God’s existence, religious experience, 
divine attributes, the problem of evil, miracles, life after death, faith and reason, and 
many others are debated (see e.g., Peterson, Hasker, et. al 2014; 2003; Craig, 2002; 
Swinburne 2004). As we shall see, there are also excellent reasons to think that 
theological claims spread their tentacles over the scientific domain.  
Of course, nothing I have said up to this point is shielded from objections. In this 
case, following Plantinga, I anticipate two objections, namely de facto and de jure 
respectively (2000, viii–xii). The de facto objections focus on challenging the truths 
Christians believe in the face of the ongoing suffering and evil in the world. It has been 
said that the presence of suffering and evil is incompatible with an all–powerful and 
all–knowing God who claims to have shown his love to us via his son. The de jure 
objections state that regardless of whether Christian belief is true, it remains to be 
unjustified or irrational or lacks sufficient evidence, or intellectually inferior to other 
disciplines. Christian philosophers, including Plantinga, have given ingenious 
responses to each of these objections. Here I do not want to regurgitate those responses 
or add my own to an existing list. Instead, I will respond to both of these objections 
against the backdrop of Peter Byrne’s eliminativism/agnosticism of the truths of 
theological claims.  
 
4.2. Peter Byrne’s Theological Eliminativism/Agnosticism and Lowe’s Synergistic 
Model  
 
In his God and Realism, Peter Byrne (2003), made a case against theological realism. 
Byrne’s critique of theological realism is situated in the comparison he draws between 
Christian theology and natural science. According to Byrne, both theology and natural 
science are discursive elaboration and exploration of claims about the divine and the 
material world. In both of these cases, the central question that needs to be taken 
seriously is this: can theology and science be interpreted realistically? For Byrne, only 
natural science receives an affirmative answer to this question. Byrne claims that the 
 
25 Here I have in mind specific responses given to objections that challenge the veracity of the divine 
revelation (see e.g., Craig 1994; Copan and Craig 2004).  




history of science shows us that science is a cumulative enterprise. That is, science 
exhibits an increased knowledge of facts. For Byrne, scientific thought and practice 
are shaped by cognitive contact with reality. Science is always after figuring out what 
reality is like. This makes science progressive in the sense of getting closer and closer 
to the truths. So, science accumulates reliable beliefs through genuine ways as 
opposed to a mere accident. For Byrne, there is an asymmetry between how we 
account for thought and activity that aims at the discovery of truth and activities not 
so directed. Unlike non–realists, scientific realists believe that the aim of science is 
attaining truths about reality. Science tracks such truths through dynamic ways which 
also allows it to correct itself in light of new evidence. For example, we no longer 
believe in phlogiston and ether. The past theories always pave the way for the later 
ones thereby allowing science to undergo a dynamic process—ensuring constant 
improvement (2003, 155–161). As Byrne states,  
 
One of the reasons why science tends to produce reliable beliefs about the world rests 
upon the fact that the scientific community is bound by norms of proof and evidence… 
experimental results in science are not valid unless they come with the means to enable 
other experimenters to repeat the experiments and produce the results. There are good 
standards of good work and good reasoning in science and those standards are 
productive of beliefs…[which] enable scientists to be open for real–world influences 
(Ibid. 161).   
 
Given such a view of natural science, for Byrne, two things would follow. First, natural 
science has the most reliable epistemic foundation in uncovering truths about the 
nature of reality. Second, its emphasis on discovering truths about reality qualifies 
science to be interpreted realistically.  
In contrast, no such realistic interpretation is warranted when it comes to Christian 
theology. Theology does not enable its practitioners to have cognitive contact with 
divine reality. Byrne claims that the academic discipline of theology does not produce 
reliable beliefs about God or anything at all. Theology cannot be understood 
realistically. There is no moral knowledge and inquiry in theology that is analogous 
to the morality of scientific knowledge. Theology is non–cumulative, that is, it does 
not make progress in gaining insights into reality. Yet Byrne claims that his non–realist 
position concerning theological claims is not intended to prove the non–existence of 
God or unknowability of God. Byrne claims that there may be a God. Some classes of 
beliefs could even be said to be reliable. But there is no way to investigate the beliefs 
in question via inter–subjective collaboration. For Byrne, the lack of inter–subjective 
investigation of theological claims means that we cannot invest in theological inquiry 
to acquire a body of reliable beliefs about God. So, Byrne claims that we should be 
theological skeptics/agnostics. This is because, as a discipline, for Byrne, theology is 
incapable of advancing a stock of reliable beliefs about independent objective reality. 
Theology can be said to involve reason and argument. However, for Byrne, theology 
still lacks the means to establish its reliability. So, for Byrne, the fate of theology must 




be its elimination from being one of the domains of inquiry where reliable beliefs are 
produced (Ibid. 161–165). Here is Byrne’s key argument (Ibid. 162):  
 
i. All disciplines of thought that can be interpreted realistically show the 
accumulation of reliable beliefs.  
ii. Theology does not show the accumulation of reliable beliefs. 
iii. Therefore, theology cannot be interpreted realistically.  
 
Reply 1: Byrne’s argument above is a valid deductive argument. As we know from 
our elementary study of logic, if the premises of a deductive argument are true, then 
the conclusion must also be true. In light of this, if the premises (i) and (ii) are true, 
then the conclusion (iii) must necessarily be true. In this regard, Byrne can get a free 
pass. But I will argue that Byrne’s argument is not sound because premise (ii) is false. 
If there are compelling reasons for thinking that (ii) is false, then the conclusion of this 
argument (iii) would not follow.    
There are two major conditions that Byrne’s characterization of natural science 
must satisfy for his theological anti–realism to take off the ground. First, there must 
be a scientific method that is exclusively owned by natural science. Second, it must be 
true that, as a matter of fact, theological questions do not coincide with scientific 
questions in regard to the nature of reality. Let us call these two conditions, the 
exclusively scientific methodology and the non–coincidence of theological questions with the 
questions of natural science respectively. If Byrne’s argument introduced above fails to 
satisfy these two conditions, then his eliminativism of theological realism falls apart. 
Notice that for Byrne, the two conditions above hinge on the phrase he repeatedly 
uses, which is, ‘accumulation of reliable beliefs.’ In Byrne’s view, natural science is 
equipped with a distinctive methodology that enables it to keep making progress, 
which results in the accumulation of reliable beliefs.  
But what is a scientific methodology? For philosophers of science, this is a million–
dollar question because it is not clear at all what constitutes the supposed scientific 
method in question. For example, in his Christianity and the Nature of Science, J. P. 
Moreland argues why there is no such thing as the scientific methodology. Instead, 
the best we can say in this regard, as Moreland claims, is that there is a cluster of 
practices and issues that are used in different settings which can be loosely described 
as scientific methodologies. Furthermore, as Moreland argues, other disciplines 
outside science also practice the sorts of methodologies attributed to science. For 
Moreland, it is naïve to think that there is a single, clear–cut method used exclusively 
by science alone. This is because science is not an isolated discipline from other 
disciplines such as philosophy and theology. But a restricted application of scientific 
methodology arises, as Moreland sees it, from a superficial grasp of human action. 
Moreland’s point is that formulating, using, and justifying scientific ideas is part and 
the parcel of human action which by its very nature is multifaceted (1989, 59–60; Cf. 
Rosenberg 2012, chaps. 7–15; Lowe 2008, Part II). Since no exclusive scientific 




methodology exists, Byrne’s account fails to satisfy the first condition. Hence, his 
effort to establish his theological anti–realism faces a roadblock.  
But the absence of an exclusive scientific methodology means that other disciplines 
such as theology can advance their own agenda independently. In this case, theology 
is not answerable to natural science to be justified in what it pursues. But this does not 
mean that theology should not defer to natural science in certain areas of investigation 
of reality. Of course, there are complicated models of interaction that are said to show 
the integration of science and theology. For example, Garrett DeWeese and J. P. 
Moreland discuss five such models (2005, 151ff; see also Carlson 2000). Firstly, the two 
realms model. According to this model, propositions in theology and other disciplines 
are said to generally involve two distinct, non–overlapping areas of investigation. For 
example, debate on the doctrine of atonement has little, if at all, to do with quantum 
physics. So, theology does not need any lecture from science to advance its knowledge 
of the doctrine of atonement. Secondly, the complementarity model. According to this 
model, propositions in science and theology are said to be non–interacting yet 
complementary approaches to the same reality. That means that these disciplines are 
said to adopt very different standpoints in the questions that they ask as well as the 
answers they give. For example, physical theory tells us what the elementary 
constituent parts of matter are, say electrons and quarks whereas theology tells us 
who created such elements. Thirdly, the direct interaction model. According to this 
model, propositions in theology and other disciplines are said to directly interact with 
each other. In doing so, they are said to offer rational support or raise rational 
difficulties for each other. For example, the existence of the soul raises a rational 
problem for scientific naturalism since it denies its existence. In the same vein, the 
general theory of evolution raises some difficulties to a certain interpretation of the 
book of Genesis.  
Fourthly, the presuppositional model. According to this model, theology is said to 
support the presuppositions of other disciplines and vice versa. For example, the 
assumptions of science, say, in regard to the finite beginning of the universe make 
sense within the context of Christian theism. Similarly, philosophical critiques of 
epistemological skepticism and defenses of a correspondence theory of truth offer 
justification for some of the presuppositions of theology. Finally, the practical 
application model. According to this model, theology is said to be in a position to fill out 
and add details to general principles in other disciplines and vice versa. Theology 
enables one to practically apply principles found in other disciplines and vice versa. 
For example, theology tells us that fathers should not provoke their children to anger. 
Psychology can give us some insights into family systems as well as the nature and 
causes of anger.  
In light of the foregoing five models, the discipline of theology is not as bankrupt 
as Byrne would like us to believe. The truth is the exact opposite. These models show 
us how theology is capable of accumulating reliable beliefs by tapping into any 
available and relevant methods of inquiry found outside as well as within its circle. 
Theology also can come to the aid of other disciplines when doing so is relevant. If 




such models of interaction between theology and other discipline are defensible which 
I believe that they are, then Byrne fails to satisfy the second condition—the non–
coincidence of theological questions with those of the natural science. Hence, once again 
Byrne’s theological anti–realism is entirely unmotivated.  
Reply 2: In light of Byrne’s failure to satisfy the two conditions that were meant to 
motivate his theological anti–realism, we are well–positioned to show why premise 
(ii) of his argument against theological realism is false. In this case, Lowe’s synergistic 
model takes center stage. Recall that Lowe’s synergistic model defends the 
Integrationist Thesis that brings together the subject matter of M and the subject matter of 
S. Recall also that the Integrationist Thesis entails both the independence as well as the 
interdependence of the subject matter of M and the subject matter of S. Taken this way, 
neither the independence nor the interdependence aspect of the thesis in question 
should be compromised in the sense of favoring one over the other. So, the thesis in 
question is as tightly knit together as anything can be.  
Against the backdrop of Lowe’s synergistic model, I propose that we should take 
theological claims identified in section 4.1 as species (versions) of 
metaphysical/ontological claims. They deserve such identification given their focus on 
the nature of reality in general and the existence of being (ontos) in particular. Let us 
call them metaphysical claims* (MCs*). It is important to see the main difference 
between Lowe’s conception of metaphysics proper and MCs*. Lowe’s metaphysics 
proper is an a priori rational inquiry into the realm of possibility. Given Lowe’s 
conception of metaphysics, there is a two–level source of epistemic justification. On 
level one, the epistemic justification for the supposed realm of possibility is rooted 
primarily in an a priori rational reflection. On level two, verifying the actual reliability 
of the supposed realm of possibility is something that should be left for natural science 
to inform us. But in the case of MCs*, we can think of a three–level source of epistemic 
justification. On level one, the epistemic justification for MCs* is primarily grounded 
in the divine revelation as I argued in section 4.1. On level two, verifying the plausibility 
and reasonableness of the nature of divine revelation can only be demonstrated by 
utilizing an a priori method or reflection. Remember that this is precisely what the 
faith–reason framework is ultimately supposed to show us. To be more precise, 
biblical faith is a rational faith, that is, it is based on reason. On level three, MCs* gets 
the relevant epistemic justification in light of its interaction with natural science. 
Notice that there are different ways that MCs* interacts with natural science as the five 
models above show us. We can describe such triangulation of epistemic justification 
for MCs* via a geometrical figure as follows: 
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Figure 2. Sources of Epistemic Justification  
 
Despite their distinctions, the three levels laid out above are interdependent. 
Moreover, all the main features of the conception of metaphysics defended by Lowe 
directly apply to MCs*. Let us look at one of the representative examples of what 
making progress, that is, accumulating reliable belief looks like in the domain of MCs*. 
Here Lowe’s four–category of ontology is a good case in point. It can be applied to the 
person of Christ. Elsewhere I have argued extensively for the 
metaphysical/ontological basis of the person of Christ (see e.g., Guta 2019b, 113–143). 
Here I cannot do more than illustrating my point in regard to how the four–category 
ontology can be adopted to discuss the ontology of the second person of Trinity.  
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Figure 3. Christological Square  
 
If we follow Byrne’s suggestion, we should eliminate the Christological Square as a 
non–starter. Given Byrne’s view of how science is supposed to work, accumulating a 
body of reliable beliefs is what only science can do. But no such reliable beliefs can be 
attained concerning MCs*. However, we already saw that there are reasons to think 
why Byrne’s theological anti–realism does not have a lot going for it. The truth is that 
natural science has nothing to offer to our knowledge of the Christological Square. 
Our primary knowledge of the truths of MCs* in the Christological Square can be 
attained based on the three–level steps discussed earlier. Of course, the Christological 
Square also has an empirical basis given that the historicity of the person and work of 
Christ is one of the most well–established areas in Christian theology.  
So, contra Byrne’s claim that genuine progress is non–existent in theology, we have 
compelling reasons to think that premise (ii) is false. That means that theology does 
show the accumulation of reliable beliefs. In this regard, the recently burgeoning area 
of research and interdisciplinary collaboration in analytic theology is a good case in 




point. For so long, theological discussions have been dominated by systematic 
theology (see e.g., Erickson 1985). But in recent decades analytic philosophers of 
religion have begun taking part in the explication of core doctrines in Christian 
theology such as the doctrine of Christ, trinity, atonement, and others (see e.g., McCall 
2021; Arcadi and Turne 2021; Crisp and Rea 2009). In explaining the goal of analytic 
theology, one of the leading contributors to the field, Michael Rea sums it up as 
follows. The first goal is, “to identify the scope and limits of our powers to obtain 
knowledge of the world” and the second goal is “to provide such true explanatory 
theories as we can in areas of inquiry (metaphysics, morals, and the like) that fall 
outside the scope of the natural sciences” (2009, 4). Rea’s remark here strengthens 
what we have been saying all along. Rea’s remark also has an implicit implication for 
theology’s capability in setting an agenda for natural science. For example, theology 
strongly assumes that the universe was created by a personal God. But the details that 
go into what such a universe is composed of or what its fundamental properties are 
like are issues that can be studied by natural sciences, say, physics, chemistry, and 
biology. What we can come to know about the universe via such disciplines can, 
therefore, reinforces the central truths already asserted by MCs*. So rather than 
enmity, what we see here is, cooperation between natural science and MCs*. Similarly, 
Rea’s two goals are entirely in line with Lowe’s synergistic model.   
Anyone who follows Byrne’s lead can mount the sorts of objections we considered 
against Lowe’s conception of metaphysics which we found them to be wanting. For 
example, one may try to undermine the role of MCs* for our knowledge of the nature 
of reality. Alternatively, one may elevate the role of science. But the responses we 
already produced in defense of Lowe’s conception of metaphysics equally apply to 
show the defensibility of MCs*. But there is no need to rerun those objections and 
responses here. But in closing, it is worth saying something albeit briefly regarding 
Byrne’s response to the two objections Plantinga identifies as de facto and de jure. Recall 
that the former objection targets the credibility of MCs* in the face of suffering and 
evil. The latter objection dismisses the credibility of MCs* ultimately as being 
irrational and an intellectually unworthy project.    
Given his theological anti–realism, Byrne wholeheartedly embraces both the de facto 
and the de jure objections. But to those of us who think that these objections fail to 
succeed in rendering MCs* unreliable, Byrne has a reply along the following lines. 
Here Byrne’s response targets Plantinga's treatment of the above two objections. As 
Byrne claims: 
 
Even those who think that the Godhead does implant theological beliefs into people 
will have to concede that the process has not worked to establish an increasing stock 
of reliable beliefs about this God. What do Christians know more about God now than 
they did 800 years ago? (2003, 167) 
 
A central flaw in Byrne’s reply is that he thinks that there is only one way to obtain 
reliable beliefs about reality and that is a scientific way. We saw with enough examples 




why such conception of the role of science is not only dubious but also is deeply 
mistaken. There are non–scientific disciplines that benefit from science and vice versa. 
We don’t have a one–way street here. Instead, we have a multiple–way street that 
feeds into each other all the relevant and accurate information about the nature of 
reality. Nothing short of such a holistic approach could be taken as a promising way 
to ensure progress in dealing with both MCs* and natural science. In this case, Lowe’s 
synergistic model is the most effective and superior to that of Byrne’s eliminativist–
agnostic approach. In light of such considerations, as I see it, there is no good reason 
to think that premise (ii) of Byrne’s argument is true. If I am right about this, then we 
can modify it and turn Byrne’s initial argument on its head as follows:  
 
i. All disciplines of thought that can be interpreted realistically show the 
accumulation of reliable beliefs.  
ii. Theology does show the accumulation of reliable belief. 
iii.  Therefore, theology can be interpreted realistically. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
In this paper, I have aimed to discuss E. J. Lowe's view of the synergy between 
metaphysics and natural science. In doing so, I extended Lowe’s synergistic model to 
develop a realist account of theological claims thereby responding to Byrne’s strong 
form of eliminativism and agnosticism about theological claims. In light of the reasons 
presented in this paper, I concluded that there are no good reasons to embrace Byrne’s 
theological anti–realism. In contrast, there are excellent reasons to embrace theological 
realism. In this case, Lowe’s synergistic model proves itself to be superior to that of 
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